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THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REGULATORY AND
INTEREST RATE CONTROL ACT OF 1978, FEDERAL
BANKING AGENCIES, AND THE JUDICIARY: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE LIMITATION OF CEASE
AND DESIST ORDER AUTHORITY
Confronted with an alarming number of bank failures in the early 1970s,
the United States Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA) to curtail bank failures by
regulating the banking industry more closely.' Before Congress enacted
1. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA), PUB.
L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see H.R.
REP. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9273,
9279-80 [hereinafter FIRA House Report] (recounting failures by various financial institutions
that caused alarm to the Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs Committee). The Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA) supplemented the
regulatory power Congress granted to the Banking Agencies in the Financial Institutions
Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA). Financial Institutional Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), Pus.
L. No. 89-110, 80 Stat. 1028 0966) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
FISA empowered Banking Agencies to issue temporary and permanent cease and desist orders
to depositary institutions when a depository institution violated a federal banking law or
regulation, or when a depository institution committed an unsafe or unsound banking practice.
See S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONi. & AD.
NEws 3523, 3533 (1966) [hereinafter FISA Senate Report] (describing powers created under
FISA). FISA also authorized Banking Agencies to remove officers and directors of financial
institutions for violating a federal banking law or regulation, or a final cease and desist order
issued by a Banking Agency pursuant to FISA. Id. In enacting FISA, however, Congress
restricted the removal authority to cases in which a director's dishonest conduct had caused
or probably would cause substantial financial loss to the financial institution. Id.
Before Congress enacted FIRA, a Banking Agency could institute a cease and desist order
proceeding against an institution only. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act Amendments of
1977, S. REP. No. 95-1, 6 (1977). Banking Agencies argued that FISA did not allow the agencies
to take effective action when a particular individual, rather than an entire institution, was at
fault. Id. In addition, the agencies complained that FISA authorized Banking Agencies to
remove individual directors only when a director was personally dishonest. Id. Accordingly,
Congress enacted FIRA in response to complaints by the Banking Agencies that FISA too
closely restricted the power of the Banking Agencies to control banking practices. See FIRA
House Report, supra, at 9289 (recounting purposes for expanding regulatory power of Banking
Agencies).
FIRA is a lengthy and complicated act containing 20 titles that changed regulatory powers
of various federal banking agencies. See FIRA House Report, supra, at 9275 (summarizing
content of 20 titles in FIRA). Title I of FIRA increased the supervisory authority of federal
banking agencies over depositary institutions. See FIRA House report, supra, at 9276. More
specifically, FIRA provided additional powers over depository institutions to the four major
financial institution supervisory agencies: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(Comptroller), the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
1357
1358 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
FIRA, the federal banking regulatory agencies could issue cease and desist
orders for unsafe or illegal banking practices against financial institutions
only.2 Congress intended FIRA to increase the regulatory authority of the
four major banking regulatory agencies: the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the "Banking Agencies").3 Through FIRA Con-
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) [hereinafter referred to collectively as
"Banking Agencies" and individually as a "Banking Agency"]. Id. The increased supervisory
powers granted to Banking Agencies in FIRA include the ability to assess civil money penalties
against directors of depository institutions, as well as improved cease and desist authority. Id.
Unlike FISA, FIRA allows the Banking Agencies to issue cease and desist orders directly
against individual directors. FIRA House Report, supra, at 9276. In addition, under FIRA
the Banking Agencies can enforce cease and desist orders, as well as banking law, against
individual directors by levying civil money penalties directly against individual directors. Id.
at 9289. Under the civil money penalty provisions of FIRA a Banking Agency must show only
that the director has continued to violate a law or a cease and desist order after becoming
aware of the violation. Id. Because a Banking Agency does not have to prove a director's
personal dishonesty to issue a cease and desist order, the Banking Agency can act more quickly
and effectively than if it were seeking removal of a director under FISA. See infra note 19
(outlining procedure used in acquiring or objecting to cease and desist order); note 5 (outlining
more completely various civil money penalty provisions in FIRA); note 3 (outlining more
specifically statutes and agencies affected by FIRA).
2. See, supra, note I (discussing regulatory power extended by Congress to Banking
Agencies in FISA).
3. FIRA, Put. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.). In enacting FIRA, Congress amended the National Bank Act, the Federal
Reserve Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Homeowners Loan Act, and the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act to give the Banking Agencies expanded regulatory authority within
each agency's respective enabling statue. See Nicholas, FIRA: Emerging Patterns of Director
Liability, 103 BANKING L.J. 151, 157 0986) (listing various acts that FIRA amended). Each
Banking Agency regulates a different category of financial institution, although some inevitable
spillover exists between the regulatory powers of the different Banking Agencies. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) delegates cease and desist authority to the appropriate Banking
Agency that has authority to regulate a specific financial institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1)
(1982). Under the FDIA the Comptroller has regulatory authority over national banking
associations, a district bank, or a federal branch of a foreign bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1982).
The FDIC has regulatory authority over state banks insured by the FDIC, as well as several
other, less common types of financial institutions. Id. The FDIC also regulates state banks
insured by the FDIC that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. Id. Finally, the
FDIA grants to the FHLBB regulatory authority over insured federal savings banks. Id. Thus,
each banking authority that may regulate a specific financial institution under the FDIA is an
appropriate Banking Agency under the FDIA and, therefore, may issue a cease and desist
order against the institution pursuant to the FDIA. Id.
In addition to the regulatory authority that Congress granted to the Banking Agencies in
the FDIA, Congress granted regulatory authority to Banking Agencies in a number of other
statutes. Accordingly, in each case in which an agency has power to regulate a depository
institution, Congress expanded that power in FIRA to include the authority to issue cease and
desist orders and to assess civil money penalties. FIRA, PuB. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Federal Reserve Act, for example,
allows the Federal Reserve Board to regulate any national or state bank or trust company that
becomes a member of the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 504, 505 (1982) (powers
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gress empowered the Banking Agencies to issue cease and desist orders
directly against directors and officers of regulated financial institutions for
unsafe or illegal banking practices. 4 In addition, Congress strengthened their
authority by authorizing the Banking Agencies to levy civil money penalties
directly against directors and officers who violated the cease and desist
orders issued under FIRA.s Congress further strengthened the FIRA cease
granted to Federal Reserve Board by FIRA); see also 12 U.S.C. § 221 (1982) (defining member
bank under control of Federal Reserve Board). The Federal Home Loan Act allows the FHLBB
to regulate home and loan associations, cooperative banks, homestead associations, insurance
companies, or savings banks that the FHLBB has established pursuant to the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1424 (1982) (describing eligibility requirements for member
banks under Federal Home Loan Bank Act). The National Bank Act allows the Comptroller
to regulate National Banking Associations. See 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1982) (allowing Comptroller to
bring suit or assess civil money penalty for violations of National Bank Act). The Comptroller
is also one of the three managing directors of the FDIC. Consequently, FDIA also empowers
the Comptroller to regulate insured banks that are also national banking associations. See 12
U.S.C. § 1812 (1982) (establishing membership of FDIC); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982) (granting
cease and desist authority to appropriate Banking Agency for insured bank).
4. FIRA House Report, supra note 1, at 9276-77; see supra note 1 (discussing congres-
sional grant of regulatory authority to Banking Agencies in FIRA). Congress in FIRA amended
a large number of banking statutes in an identical manner. The amendment to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act is indicative of the many expanded cease and desist authority provisions
that Congress placed in different statutes through FIRA. FIRA House Report, supra note 1,
at 9276-77; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982). Under FDIA the appropriate federal banking agency
may issue a cease and desist order against any director, officer, employee, agent, or other
person participating in the conduct of banking. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982); see supra note 2
(discussing definition under FDIA of appropriate Banking Agency). Pursuant to the amend-
ments in the FDIA, an appropriate Banking Agency may issue a cease and desist order when
the agency believes that a director is engaged, has engaged, or is about to engage in an unsafe
or unsound banking practice in conducting the bank's affairs. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982).
The Banking Agency also may issue a cease and desist order when the agency has reason to
believe that the individual is violating, has violated, or is about to violate a law, a federal
regulation, or any condition imposed in writing by the agency. Id.
The Banking Agency commences a cease and desist proceeding pursuant to FDIA by
serving a notice of charges that specifies the violations or practices to which the Banking
Agency objects and fixes a time and place for a hearing. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982); see also
12 C.F.R. § 19.19 (1986) (regulation promulgated by Comptroller that includes requirements of
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982)). Any party who does not appear at the hearing, either personally
or by representative, consents to the issuance of the cease and desist order. 12 U.S.C. §
1818(b)(1) (1982)); see 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2) (1982) (granting identical authority to FHLBB); 12
U.S.C. § 1730(e)(1) (1982) (granting cease and desist authority identical to power in FDIA to
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), agency under direction of FHLBB).
5. FIRA House Report, supra note 1, at 9276-77; see supra note I (discussing improved
cease and desist authority under FIRA). Sections 1841 through 1847 of the Federal Reserve Act
authorize the Federal Reserve Board to assess civil money penalties against financial institutions
and their directors for violations of reserve requirements, interest rate limitations, and limi-
tations on loans to executive officers. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1847 (1982). Under the direction of the
FHLBB the FSLIC may assess penalties for a violation of the Savings and Loan Holding
Company Act and the Change in Savings and Loan Control Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a)
(1982) (holding company act); 12 U.S.C. § 1730(g) (1982) (control act). Furthermore, the
Comptroller may assess penalties for many of the same lending violations as the Federal
Reserve may assess and for violations of any provision of the National Bank Act. See 12
13591987]
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and desist order provisions by authorizing each Banking Agency to take
necessary affirmative action to enforce the cease and desist orders issued
under FIRA.
6
Despite the increased authority of the Banking Agencies under FIRA to
issue and enforce cease and desist orders, bank failures continued to increase
in the early 1980s. 7 To prevent banking practices that could cause banks to
fail, the Banking Agencies greatly increased the number of regulatory actions
against financial institutions and their directors. 8 Furthermore, at least two
of the Banking Agencies, the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller,
have interpreted language in the cease and desist order provisions of FIRA
broadly. 9 In addition to issuing and enforcing cease and desist orders or
U.S.C. § 93(b) 0982) (Comptroller's authority to assess civil money penalty under National
Bank Act); 12 U.S.C. §§ 375, 375(a), 375(b), 376 0982) (Comptroller's authority similar to
authority of Federal Reserve Board).
Most of the civil money penalties authorized under FIRA provide a maximum penalty of
$1000 per day. See Nicholas, supra note 3, at 158-59 (describing various penalties created by
FIRA). The civil money penalties are flexible administrative devices because the agency may
consider "the appropriateness of the remedy with respect to the size of financial resources
and good faith of the association or person charged, the gravity of the violation, the history
of previous violations, and such other matters as justice may require." 12 U.S.C. § 93(a)
0982).
6. 12 U.S.C. 1818(b)(1) 0982). The text of the general authorizing language of the FDIA
allowing the Comptroller to take necessary affirmative action states:
Such [cease and desist] orders may, by provisions which are mandatory or otherwise,
require the bank or its directors, officers, employees, agents, and other persons
participating in the conduct of the affairs of such bank to cease and desist from
the same, and, further, to take affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting
from any such violation or practice.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. See Nicholas, supra nnte 3, at 152 (discussing continued failure of banks after
Congress enacted FIRA). Between 1959 and 1971 fifty-six banks failed. M. MAYER, THE BANKERs
391 (1979). Seventy-nine banks failed in 1984 and seventy-five banks had failed by September
of 1985. Id. Failures of savings and loan associations insured by FSLIC also increased after
Congress enacted FIRA. Since 1934, 627 savings and loan associations have failed. Nicholas,
supra note 3, at 152. Eighty percent of the 627 savings and loans associations failed between
the years 1980 and 1984. Id.
8. See Nicholas, supra note 3, at 151-52 (discussing escalating number of lawsuits brought
by Banking Agencies against directors of banks); Vartanian & Schley, Bank Officer and
Director Liability-Regulatory Actions, 39 Bus. LAW. 1021-23 (1984) (discussing new "get
tough" attitude of Banking Agencies); GAO Study of Federal Bank Regulations: Hearings
Before the Subcom. on Baking, Finance & Urban Affairs and Comm. on Government
Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-80 (1977) (statement of Elmer P. Staats, Comptroller
General of United States) (discussing history of Banking Agency regulating efforts).
9. See, e.g., Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1245 (7th Cir.
1986) (discussing Comptroller's decision to compel directors of bank to indemnify bank for
losses resulting from directors' illegal conduct); Citizens State Bank of Marshfield, Missouri
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 751 F.2d 209, 216 (8th Cir. 1984) (discussing suit brought by
FDIC to force directors of bank to reimburse clients for overcharges resulting from violations
of TILA); Independent Bankers' Ass'n of America v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 116 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (discussing regulation promulgated by Comptroller preventing insiders in bank from
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assessing money penalties directly against directors of financial institutions,
the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller have ordered directors person-
ally to indemnify financial institutions for losses resulting from illegal or
unsafe banking practices.' 0 By ordering or threatening to order directors
personally to indemnify financial institutions, the Banking Agencies have
created substantial leverage both in correcting a violation of an order and
in preventing similar violations by directors of other financial institutions.,
Afraid to antagonize a federal authority that governed the day-to-day
management of the finance industry, directors of regulated financial insti-
tutions have hesitated to challenge the expansive regulatory approach taken
by the FDIC and the Comptroller.' 2 One bank, however, challenged the
indemnification power of the Comptroller of the Currency under FIRA.1
3
In In re First National Bank of Eden, South Dakota v. Department of the
Treasury, Office of the Comptroller4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the cease and desist provisions
of FIRA authorized the Comptroller of the Currency to order certain
directors of the First National Bank of Eden (Eden Bank) to indemnify the
bank for bonuses improperly paid by the directors to themselves. 5 In Bank
of Eden the Comptroller issued a cease and desist order pursuant to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) directing the Eden Bank to correct
certain aspects of investment policy and to correct problems with internal
management. 6 More specifically, the order directed the Eden Bank to limit
benefiting personally from receipt of credit life insurance sold to bank's borrowers); Nicholas,
supra note 3, at 163-64 (discussing expansive regulatory approaches of FDIC and Comptroller);
see also Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 665 F.2d 279, 279
(10th Cir. 1981) (discussing decision by FHLBB to prevent savings and loan association from
offering legal checking accounts for 268 days because savings and loan association had offered
illegal checking accounts for 268 days).
10. See, e.g., Larimore v. Comptroller of Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1245 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Comptroller orders directors of bank personally to indemnify bank for losses resulting from
illegal bank loans); Citizens State Bank of Marshfield, Missouri v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209, 216
(8th Cir. 1984) (FDIC orders directors of bank to reimburse customers for overcharges resulting
from violations of TILA); del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1982) (Comp-
troller orders directors of bank personally to indemnify bank for losses resulting from illegal
bank loans), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); In re First National Bank of Eden, South
Dakota v. Dept. of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller, 568 F.2d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1978)
(Comptroller orders directors to indemnify banks for personal bonuses improperly paid to
directors).
11. See generally Nicholas, supra note 3, at 165-66, 181 (criticizing extent of regulatory
authority exercised by Banking Agencies).
12. See Callaghan, Banker's Guide to the Comptroller's Enforcement Authority, reprinted
in 207 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ENFORCEMENT ANt) COMPLIANCE UNDER BANKING LAWS
AND REGuLATIoNs 143, 143 (1976) (acknowledging banker's need to cooperate with bank
regulatory agencies and offering guidelines for communication with bank regulators).
13. See In re First Nat'l Bank of Eden, South Dakota v. Office of the Comptroller, 568
F.2d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1978) (bank protests cease and desist order from Comptroller).
14. 568 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1978).
15. Bank of Eden, 568 F.2d at 611.
16. Id. In Bank of Eden the Comptroller served a notice of charges and a temporary
19871 1361
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salaries and bonuses for executive officers and required the president and
vice-president of the Eden Bank to reimburse the bank for 61,000 dollars
paid out to them in personal bonuses during 1975.17 The Eden Bank
petitioned the Eighth Circuit to review the Comptroller's issuance of the
cease and desist order.' s Relying on the general language of the cease and
desist order provision in FIRA, the Eighth Circuit found that substantial
evidence supported the Comptroller's findings and that the provisions in
the cease and desist order were not arbitrary or capricious. 9 Accordingly
the Bank of Eden court upheld the Comptroller's action with little comment
or explanation.
20
cease and desist order upon Eden Bank. Id. At a hearing an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
concluded that the Comptroller had supported his allegations of unsafe banking practices. Id.
The Comptroller then issued a final cease and desist order. Id.
17. Id. The final cease and desist order in Bank of Eden directed Eden Bank to
discontinue investment in criticized assets and to correct prior improper disclosures of credit
information on investments. Id. The order also directed the bank to develop a written investment
account policy, to correct deficiencies in internal control and audit procedures, and to develop
a salary plan for executive officers that specifically limited the amounts of salaries and bonuses
that the officer could receive. Id.
18. Id. at 611-12. In the Bank of Eden case Eden Bank challenged the Comptroller's
decision to limit salaries to executives and the decision to order the President and Vice-
President of Eden Bank to reimburse the bank for bonuses paid to the executive officers. Id.
at 611.
19. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) 0982) (general authority of Banking Agency under the
FDIA to take affirmative action to enforce cease and desist order). The FDIA requires a
Banking Agency to conduct an agency hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) to determine whether a Banking Agency should issue a cease and desist order against
a director of a bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h) (1982). Any party to the cease and desist order
proceeding may obtain judicial review of the order by filing suit either in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the United States Court of Appeals
for the circuit of the home office of the bank. Id.
The FDIA also provides for an agency hearing upon the record. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1982).
The language "agency hearing upon the record" triggers chapter seven of the APA and
provides the standard for review of the cease and desist order for the appellate court. 5 U.S.C.
§ 556 (1982); see United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224, 242 (holding
that "agency hearing upon record" requires adherence to formal hearing requirements in
APA). Section 706 of the APA provides the scope of review for the appellate court when an
agency statute triggers the formal hearing requirements of chapter seven of the APA. See 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1982). Section 706 directs an appellate court to invalidate and set aside agency
actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The court also must set aside actions that
violate a constitutional tight or that exceed the statutory authority of an agency. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(b)-(c) (1982). The court must set aside an action committed by an agency without
properly observing procedure set forth either by the APA or by the agency statute. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). Notwithstanding that the agency properly has conducted a formal hearing
pursuant to chapter seven of the APA, the appellate court further must set aside agency action
that the agency cannot support with substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). In
reviewing a cease and desist order, therefore, the court must determine first whether the action
is arbitrary and capricious. Upon determining that the agency action is not arbitrary and
capricious, the court then must determine whether substantial evidence supports the order.
20. Bank of Eden, 568 F.2d at 611-612.
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In del Junco v. Conover21 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the legality of a similar exercise of cease and desist
order authority by the Comptroller under the FDIA. 22 In del Junco the
Comptroller conducted a routine periodic examination of the Los Angeles
National Bank. 23 During the examination the Comptroller discovered that
the bank had violated federal lending limits set by the National Bank Act.
24
The Comptroller determined that the bank had made three loans to separate
entities that actually were only one entity.2- Aggregately, the second and
third loans exceeded the lending limit of the National Bank Act. 26 After an
administrative hearing the Comptroller issued a cease and desist order that
directed the Los Angeles National Bank to reduce immediately the aggregate
amount of the three loans to an amount within the lending limit of the
National Bank Act.27 The Comptroller further ordered the directors of the
21. 682 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982).
22. del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1982); see infra note 24 (discussing
federal lending limit under National Bank Act).
23. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1339.
24. Id. Originally, Section 84 of the National Bank Act limited the amount of credit a
national banking association could extend to one person. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1980). The Act
prevented a bank from lending more than an amount equal to ten percent of the bank's
capital stock to any one person, partnership, association, or corporation. Id. Section 84
attempted to prevent unwise extensions of credit by a banking association or unwise reliance
by the banking association upon a single source of revenue. Id. Congress subsequently amended
section 84 of the National Bank Act, expanding and more carefully defining limits on the
amount of credit a bank could extend to one person. See 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1983) (current lending
limit under National Bank Act that updates and expands limitations on bank lending policy
to single entity). Because the court in del Junco assumed a violation of the lending limit in
section 84, the subsequent amendment to the lending limit section does not affect the court's
analysis or holding. See del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1340.
25. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1340. In del Junco the directors of the Los Angeles National
Bank loaned money to Rehbock Lewis, the president of Fame Furniture Co., Inc.; to Fame
Furniture Co., Inc.; and to Ralph Ware, the treasurer of Fame Furniture Co., Inc. Id. The
Comptroller argued that the three loans together violated a regulation promulgated by the
Comptroller that incorporates the lending limits of section 84 of the National Bank Act. Id.;
12 C.F.R. § 7.1310(c)(3) (1981). The regulation allowed the Comptroller to aggregate loans made
directly to a corporation and loans used for the benefit of the corporation. Id. The Ninth
Circuit found that all three loans had been used for the benefit of Fame Furniture, Inc., and
therefore upheld the conclusion of the Comptroller that the Comptroller could aggregate loans
to Rehbock Lewis and Ralph Ware with the loan to Fame Furniture Co., Inc. Id.
26. See del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1338 (recounting decision of Comptroller to view three
loans made by director of Los Angeles National Bank aggregately); supra note 25 (discussing
nature of three loans in del Junco).
27. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1340. In del Junco the ALJ concluded that the Comptroller
should reduce the potential liability of the directors, an amount equalling $350,000, by offsetting
a checking account of Fame Furniture Co., Inc. and by selling bonds assigned as security to
the loan to Ralph Ware. Id. The Comptroller, however, refused to allow any reduction of the
directors' liability until Rehbock Lewis had repaid the first loan made. Id. Upholding the
Comptroller's decision, the Ninth Circuit argued that allowing the directors to use assets to
secure illegal extensions of credit while leaving a legal extension unsecured would frustrate the
purposes of the lending limit under the National Bank Act. Id. at 1343. The del Junco court
concluded that the Comptroller acted properly in precluding the directors from protecting
themselves against liability at the expense of the bank. Id.
136319871
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Los Angeles National Bank to indemnify the bank for the full amount of
the final two loans which they had made in violation of banking law and
to pay the bank's collection costs as well as attorneys' fees paid by the
bank for the directors' defense.
2
The directors of the Los Angeles National Bank appealed the Comp-
troller's action to the Ninth Circuit. 29 The directors argued that the Comp-
troller had acted improperly in ordering indemnification and in awarding
collection costs and attorneys' fees to the bank.30 The del Junco court
initially determined that the standard to review a Comptroller's cease and
desist order was whether substantial evidence supported the Comptroller's
findings. 3 The Ninth Circuit explained that once the Comptroller provided
substantial evidence supporting the finding that an individual director had
violated banking law, the choice of action to take against the director is
within the informed discretion of the Comptroller. 32 The del Junco court
28. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1340. In del Junco the potential liability of the directors of
the Los Angeles National Bank equalled the sum of the two excess loans made to Fame
Furniture Co., Inc. and Ralph Ware, $350,000. Id. The liability was joint and several, and
the Comptroller refused to lower the amount of the liability until Rehbock Lewis fully repaid
the first, unsecured loan. Id.; see supra notes 25-27 (discussing del Junco court's approval of
Comptroller's treatment of three loans made by directors of Los Angeles National Bank). The
Comptroller's order required the directors to indemnify the bank for the full amount of the
liability and then to transfer all rights in the loans back to the bank. del Junco, 682 F.2d at
1340 n.3. Accordingly, the directors could receive no benefit from any recovery later made on
the illegal loans in excess of the amount of the liability and, thus, ultimately were liable for
the entire amount of the final two loans made to Fame Furniture Co., Inc. and Ralph Ware.
Id.
29. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1340.
30. Id.
31. Id. In del Junco the Ninth Circuit relied on § 706(2)(E) of the APA to determine
the standard of review of the Comptroller's decision to issue the cease and desist order. Id.;
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e) (1982) (establishing substantial evidence standard of review of agency
action); see supra note 19 (discussing standard of review under APA for an appellate court
reviewing a cease and desist order).
32. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1340. The Ninth Circuit cited Groos National Bank v.
Comptroller of Currency to support its decision to defer to the Comptroller's discretion in
fashioning relief to prevent future abuses of banking law. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1340. In
Groos the Comptroller determined that the Groos National Bank's banking practices were
unsafe because of a large percentage of high risk loans made by the bank and a high
concentration of loans to two individuals, one of whom held controlling interest in the bank.
Groos National Bank v. Comptroller of Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 892 (5th Cir. 1978). The
Comptroller negotiated informally with the directors of the Groos National Bank and reached
an agreement in 1973. Id. The agreement forbade loans and extensions of credit to any
shareholder owning five percent or more of the voting stock of the bank. Id. Subsequently,
Groos National Bank made three extensions of credit in 1976 to Clinton Manges, the controlling
stockholder of the bank. Id. at 892-93. All three credit extensions violated the bank's agreement
with the Comptroller. Id.
Upon discovering the credit extensions, the Comptroller issued a temporary cease and
desist order that prohibited the bank from extending credit to Manges, his relatives, or his
business associations. Id. After a hearing before an ALJ, the Comptroller issued a final cease
and desist order based on the finding by the ALJ that Groos National Bank had violated the
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found that there was substantial evidence to support the Comptroller's
finding that the directors of the Los Angeles National Bank had made three
loans to one entity and that the loans, viewed aggregately, violated the
lending limit in the National Bank Act. 33 Accordingly, the court concluded
that the directors had violated the National Banking Act.
34
The Ninth Circuit in del Junco then considered whether the Comptroller
had authority under FIRA to order the directors to indemnify the Los
Angeles National Bank for the loans that violated the National Bank Act. 35
The del Junco court acknowledged that, before Congress enacted FIRA,
the Comptroller could make a director of a bank personally liable for
violating banking law only by suing the director in federal district court.36
The Ninth Circuit further acknowledged that, prior to the enacting of FIRA,
the Comptroller could impose liability upon the director in court pursuant
to the National Bank Act only by showing that the director either knowingly
committed or knowingly permitted a violation of banking law. 37 The direc-
tors of the Los Angeles National Bank argued that the scienter requirement
in the National Bank Act restricted the Comptroller's authority to order a
director to indemnify a financial institution. 38 The del Junco court reasoned,
however, that even if the cease and desist provision in the FDIA included
the requirement of a knowing violation from the National Bank Act as a
prerequisite to director liability, the Comptroller had proven scienter. 39 The
1973 agreement and that the violations were an unsafe and unsound banking practice. Id. at
894-95. The bank challenged the final cease and desist order before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the order was overly broad. Id. at 897.
Concluding that the Comptroller's authority to frame a remedial order was broad, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the order. Id. The Groos court concluded that the Comptroller's order was
proper, absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
33. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1341. In del Junco the Comptroller presented evidence that
Fame Furniture Co., Inc. had overdrawn its checking account at another bank. Id. When
Ralph Ware and Rehbock Lewis approached the Los Angeles National Bank for an additional
loan, the bank's senior lending officer informed both men that the bank could make no
additional loan to either Mr. Lewis or Fame Furniture Co., Inc. without violating the bank's
legal lending limit. Id. Given the action and knowledge of the lending officer in making the
third loan to Ralph Ware and the deposit of the proceeds of the third loan directly into the
account of Fame Furniture Co., Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported
the Comptroller's decision to aggregate the loans in deciding whether the directors of the Los
Angeles National Bank had violated federal lending limits under the National Bank Act. Id.;
see supra note 24 (discussing lending limits under National Bank Act).
34. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1343.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1341. The Ninth Circuit in del Junco acknowledged that the Comptroller could
sue a bank director in district court pursuant to the National Bank Act. Id.; see infra note
63 (discussing procedure for bringing suit under National Bank Act).
37. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1341.
38. Id.
39. Id. The del Junco court found that the Comptroller had shown that the directors of
the Los Angeles National Bank had knowledge of the identity of the borrowers, knowledge
that one company would use all the loan proceeds from the three loans, and knowledge of
the loan amounts and the bank's limits. Id. The Ninth Circuit cited United States v. Corbin
19871 1365
1366 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
del Junco court held that the cease and desist order was a reasonable
exercise of authority that attempted to correct financial harm caused by a
director's knowing violation of the National Bank Act. 40 The Ninth Circuit
concluded, therefore, that the Comptroller's order was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. 41 In addition, the del Junco court concluded that the Comp-
troller's decision to assess the bank's collection costs and attorneys' fees
against the directors was a reasonable exercise of authority because the
directors' knowing violation of banking law had created the additional costs
for the bank.42 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit in del Junco upheld the awards
of attorneys' fees and collection costs to the Los Angeles National Bank.
43
Neither the Bank of Eden court nor the del Junco court addressed the
more fundamental question of whether the grant of cease and desist au-
thority under FIRA empowered the Comptroller or any other banking
regulatory agency to order the director of a financial institution personally
to indemnify a financial institution for damages resulting from the directors'
violation of the National Bank Act. 44 The del Junco court approached the
Farm Service to support the decision that no director of the bank could maintain ignorance
of the lending limit as a defense against liability. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1342; United States
v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 514 (E.D. Cal.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
In Corbin the United States charged the defendant, Corbin Farm Service, a dealer and
distributor of pesticides, with knowingly violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Corbin, 444 F.Supp at 514; 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1982). The United
States claimed that Corbin Farm Service had applied a pesticide in a manner contrary to the
pesticide's labeling and, consequently, had killed numerous protected waterfowl. Corbin, 444
F.Supp at 514. The label on the pesticide prohibited use of the pesticide "where waterfowl
are known to repeatedly feed." Id.
Corbin Farm Service moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the scienter requirement
implicit in the text of the pesticide label and explicit in FIFRA itself was unconstitutionally
vague. Id. Although unable to find case law construing the scienter requirement in FIFRA,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California refused to dismiss the
action. Id. at 519. The Corbin court examined judicial interpretations of similar mens rea
requirements in other federal regulatory statutes and concluded that the government did not
need to show that Corbin Farm Service had a specific intent to violate the law, or any
knowledge of the provisions of the statute. Id. Rather, the Corbin court found that the United
States need prove only that Corbin Farm Service had knowledge that the substance it had
used was a pesticide and that the field where it used the pesticide contained feeding waterfowl.
Id.
While the Ninth Circuit in del Junco did not discuss the application of the Corbin case,
by analogy, in establishing personal liability for violating federal lending limits under the
National Bank Act, the Comptroller does not have to show that a director knew the exact
lending limit of the bank. See del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1343 (discussing scienter requirement
under National Bank Act). Rather, the Comptroller must show that the director knew or
should have known the total amount of money the bank had lent to an individual, regardless
of whether he knew the amount lent exceeded lending limits. Id.
40. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1343.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1344.
43. Id.
44. See del Junco, 682 F.2d 1338 (approving Comptroller's order requiring directors of
bank personally to indemnify bank for loans made that violated federal lending limits); Bank
of Eden, 568 F.2d 610 (approving Comptroller's order requiring directors personally to
indemnify bank for bonuses improperly made to the directors).
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question in raising the issue of whether the Comptroller must prove scienter
before ordering a director to indemnify a bank for losses that resulted from
the director's violation of the National Bank Act. 45 The del Junco court
failed, however, to decide whether the FDIA required the Comptroller to
establish scienter before requiring a director to indemnify a financial insti-
tution.4 Rather, in concluding that the Comptroller had established a finding
of scienter, the Ninth Circuit implicitly affirmed the more general power of
the Banking Agencies to order indemnification by directors through cease
and desist orders issued pursuant to FIRA.47
Unlike the del Junco court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit did consider, in Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency5 ,
whether FIRA authorized the Comptroller to order certain directors of a
bank to indemnify the bank for loans the directors made that violated
federal lending limits in the National Bank Act.49 In Larimore the Comp-
troller conducted a routine periodic examination of the First National Bank
of Mount Auburn (Auburn Bank). 0 The investigation revealed that the
board of directors of the Auburn Bank had approved loans that caused
two separate lines of credit to exceed the lending limits under the National
Bank Act. 5' After negotiating with the Comptroller informally, the board
of directors of Auburn Bank lowered the lines of credit to a level acceptable
to the Comptroller.5 2 In July of 1981, however, the board again approved
loans that caused the same two lines of credit, as well as four additional
45. See del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1342 (comparing scienter standard in § 93(a) of the
National Bank Act with Comptroller's findings in del Junco); supra note 39 (discussing relation
between Comptroller's findings in del Junco and scienter standard in National Bank Act).
46. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1342; see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing
del Junco court's treatment of scienter issue).
47. del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1342.
48. 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986).
49. Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1245 (7th Cir. 1986)
[hereinafter Larimore 11]; see 12 U.S.C. § 84 0980) (restricting amount of credit bank can lend
to one entity); supra note 24 (discussing lending limits under National Bank Act).
50. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1245-46. The First National Bank of Auburn is a small,
federally chartered bank in Illinois. Id.
51. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1245. In Larimore the Comptroller began a routine
examination of Auburn Bank in September of 1980 and finished examining Auburn Bank on
September 26, 1980. Joint Brief for Appellants Berniece Larimore, Sam M. Taylor, William
G. Butcher and Orville Bottrell at 3 [hereinafter Joint Briefl. During the examination the
Comptroller discovered that the line of credit to Bill Porter Construction and the line of credit
to Twin County Trucking and Robert Varvel both violated the lending limit provisions of the
National Bank Act. Id.; see supra note 24 (discussing lending limits under National Bank Act).
The Comptroller reported that the Porter Construction line became excessive as of September
9, 1980. Joint Brief, supra, at 3. The Comptroller reported that the Twin County and Varvel
line became excessive as of January 10, 1980. Id.
52. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1246. In Larimore the directors of the Auburn Bank brought
the Porter Construction line of credit to a level acceptable to the Comptroller within one
month of the excessive loan. Joint Brief, supra note 45, at 3. The directors brought the Twin
County and Varvel line down within one month of the Comptroller's report. Id.
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accounts, to exceed the lending limits of the National Bank Act. 53
After a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), the Comp-
troller entered a cease and desist order directly against Auburn Bank and
its directors on May 11, 1984. 54 In the order the Comptroller directed the
bank not to lend money or to extend credit to any borrower in an amount
exceeding the lending limits established by the National Bank Act. 5  The
Comptroller also directed the board of directors to reduce unlawful loan
accounts without loss to the bank and to adopt procedures to prevent the
violations from recurring. 56 Furthermore, the Comptroller ordered all of the
directors of Auburn Bank to indemnify the bank up to the potential liability
for all losses the bank had incurred or might incur as a result of the
excessive loansY7
A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the validity of the cease and desist order in
Larimore v. Conover.5s Upon review the majority of the Larimore panel
found that the Comptroller had presented substantial evidence to support
a finding that the directors knowingly had violated the lending limits of the
National Bank Act.5 9 The panel further found that the cease and desist
53. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1246. In Larimore Auburn Bank lent Porter Construction
$820,982. Department of the Treasury, In re First National Bank of Mount Auburn, Mount
Auburn, Illinois, and its Board of Directors in Their Individual and Representative Capacities
17 (1983) (M. Brown, A.L.J., recommended decision). $726,783 of the Porter loan violated the
lending limits established by the National Bank Act. Id. Auburn Bank also lent Varvel $183,470.
Id. $88,596 of the Varvel loan violated the lending limits of the National Bank Act. Id.
Finally, Auburn Bank lent a total of $655,798 on four different lines of credit to Dwight
Thomas Construction, John Thomas, Keith Montgomery, and William Moore. Id. The four
lines of credit each violated the lending limits of the National Bank Act. Id. The aggregate
amount of the violations on the four lines of credit was $269,504. Id.
54. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1246-47.
55. Id. at 1247; see supra note 24 (discussing federal lending limits under National Bank
Act).
56. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1247.
57. Id. In Larimore II the Comptroller ordered directors Bottrell, Larimore, Mulberry,
and Taylor to indemnify Auburn Bank for $1,084,883. Id. The Comptroller ordered director
Butcher to indemnify Auburn Bank for $744,053. Id.
58. 775 F.2d 890, 891 (7th Cir. 1985) (hereinafter Larimore Pane). The directors of the
Auburn Bank originally filed a complaint against C. T. Conover, then Comptroller of the
Currency. Larimore Panel, 775 F.2d at 891. When the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed
the cease and desist order in Larimore II, Robert Clarke had replaced Conover as Comptroller
of the Currency. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1244. Accordingly, the directors brought their appeal
against the Office of the Comptroller rather than against Conover. Id.
59. Larimore Panel, 775 F.2d at 896. In September of 1980 the board of directors for
the First National Bank of Mount Auburn were Herbert Bottrell, Chris Gardner, Orville
Bottrell, Berniece Larimore, Albert Mulberry, and Sam Taylor. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1247.
Orville Bottrell, president and active manager for the bank, was responsible for overall
operations. Id. Herbert Botrell resigned from the bank board of directors in 1981. Id. Neither
Bottrell nor Gardner were parties to the administrative proceedings by the Comptroller. Id.
William B. Butcher became a member of the board in January of 1982. Id. After Orville
Bottrell resigned from the office of president in December of 1982, Mr. Butcher became
president of Auburn Bank on January 25, 1983. Id. William Butcher, a farmer, never had
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order directing the officers to indemnify Auburn Bank provided a rational
means to correct the financial harm caused by the directors' approval of
loans that violated the National Bank Act. 60 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
panel affirmed the Comptroller's cease and desist order.
6'
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
granted the directors' petition for rehearing en banc, and an eight justice
majority overruled the split panel's decision in Larimore.2 In analyzing the
Comptroller's authority under FIRA to issue cease and desist orders, the
en banc court first reviewed the Comptroller's authority under the National
Bank Act to bring an action in federal district court directly against a
director of a national bank for knowingly violating or knowingly permitting
a violation of banking law.6 3 The Larimore court analyzed the Comptroller's
served as director of any bank. Joint Brief, supra note 51, at 5.
In Larimore Panel the dissenting judge of the three judge panel, Justice Coffey, argued
that substantial evidence did not support the Comptroller's decision to hold director Butcher
liable. Larimore Panel, 775 F.2d at 907 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Justice Coffey argued that
the other directors of Auburn Bank had received warnings from the Comptroller at least two
years before the Comptroller took any action. Id. Without warning Butcher against approving
loans that violated the Auburn Bank lending limit, the Comptroller treated Butcher the same
as the Comptroller had treated the directors who had received repeated communications and
warnings from the Comptroller. Id. Justice Coffey argued that, as a result, the Comptroller
had employed a different standard of knowing violation with the earlier directors than with
Butcher in determining personal liability. Id. The dissent found that Butcher was an inexpe-
rienced director, having no real knowledge of any of the Auburn Bank's lending procedures.
Id. Furthermore, the dissent argued that the Comptroller had produced no evidence to establish
that Butcher deliberately had refrained from investigating bank procedures, an action that
would have justified the Comptroller's finding of constructive knowledge. Id. As a result,
given the tenuous argument that Butcher knowingly violated federal lending limits, the dissent
refused to follow the majority position that imposed liability on Butcher. Id.; see supra note
24 (discussing federal lending limits under National Bank Act).
60. Larimore Panel, 775 F.2d at 896.
61. Id.
62. Larimore I, 789 F.2d at 1245.
63. Larinore II, 789 F.2d at 1248-49; 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982). To establish a director's
personal liability under the National Bank Act, the Comptroller first must show that loans
made by the director violated the lending limit in the National Bank Act. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a)
(1982). See Yates v. Jones National Bank, 206 U.S. 158, 179-80 (1907) (in action against directors
of bank, Comptroller first must show violation of federal banking law). Second, the Comp-
troller must show that the director participated in or assented to excessive loans, not through
mere negligence, but knowingly. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982); see Yates, 206 U.S. at 179-80
(determining that requirement of knowing violation in § 5239 Rev. Stat., now National Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93(a), precluded action against directors of national banking association for
negligent misrepresentation under Nebraska state tort law). According to interpretations of the
National Bank Act by the United States Supreme Court, if the director deliberately refrained
from investigating what he had a duty to investigate, any resulting violation of banking law
is, in effect, knowing. See, e.g., Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 74 (1919) (jury
permitted to infer knowing violation from director conduct); Jones Nat'l Bank v. Yates, 240
U.S. 541, 547 (1915) (director's reckless reliance on assurance made by bank president constituted
intentional violation); Thomas v. Taylor, 224 U.S. 73, 82 (1911) (director's failure to examine
bank records after direct warning from Comptroller was deliberate and in effect intentional);
see also 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982).
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authority to bring suit against a director in order to determine whether the
Comptroller had exhausted conventional regulatory devices. 64 The Comp-
troller unsuccessfully argued that he could sue a director under the National
Bank Act only when he also ordered dissolution of a bank.65 The Seventh
Circuit found that the history of litigation under the National Bank Act
showed that the Comptroller's power to sue a director was flexible, and
that the Comptroller could exercise the authority even when the director's
unlawful conduct had caused bank losses that would not cause insolvency."
Although acknowledging the necessity of deferring to an agency's rea-
sonable interpretation of its authorizing statute, the Larimore court ex-
plained that the National Bank Act created a duty for directors to refrain
from knowingly violating banking law.67 The Larimore court reasoned
further that the National Bank Act created a specific penalty of personal
liability for breaching the duty imposed by the National Bank Act.6 8 The
Larimore court found that the Comptroller's cease and desist order directing
indemnification created personal liability identical to that in the National
Bank Act.6 9 The Larimore court further explained that the Comptroller did
not follow the necessary step under the National Bank Act of suing a
director in federal district court and showing that a knowing violation of
banking law by the director.70 The Larimore court concluded that, therefore,
the Comptroller had attempted to avoid an established statutory scheme
and had acted without authority in ordering the directors to indemnify
Auburn Bank.7 1 The Larimore court held that because the Comptroller did
not exercise the Comptroller's established authority to sue a director in
federal district court, the Comptroller could not show the requisite need
for any indemnification power. 72
To support the holding that the Comptroller lacked authority under
FIRA to order a director to indemnify a bank for losses caused by the
directors' violating banking law, the Ninth Circuit in Larimore reviewed the
legislative history of FIRA and determined that Congress intended to restrict
the grant of cease and desist authority under FIRA within carefully guarded
64. Larimore 1I, 789 F.2d at 1249.
65. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1249.
66. Id. at 1249; see Corsicana, 251 U.S. at 83-83 (in action against director of bank,
Comptroller must show only harm to bank, not that director's action harmed bank to point
of insolvency).
67. See Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1249 n.4 (discussing judicial interpretation of Comp-
troller's authority to sue directors); see also 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982) (director may not
knowingly violate banking law); supra note 63 (recounting judicial interpretations of scienter
requirement in National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93(a)).
68. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1254; 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982).
69. Larimore 1, 789 F.2d at 1254.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1250 (stating that indemnification order was unnecessary equivalent of
personal judgment against director).
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boundaries. 73 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the broad language in the
FDIA empowered the Comptroller to order a director personally to indem-
nify a bank only when established regulatory devices could not correct a
director's violation of banking law.74 The Larimore court found that by
including broad language that authorized necessary affirmative action by
Banking Agencies, Congress intended only to allow the Comptroller to order
a director to return bank property that the director had appropriated
unlawfully for personal use.7 5 The Larimore court reasoned that Congress
empowered Banking Agencies to order indemnification in cases of unlawful
appropriation of bank property because bringing suit under the National
Bank Act would allow the director to retain the benefit from using banking
property during litigation. 76 The Larimore court explained that, additionally,
in enacting FIRA Congress had attempted to strike a balance between the
need to protect bank depositors and shareholders from irresponsible man-
agement and the need to protect financial institutions and directors from
potentially arbitrary government action. 77 The Larimore court decided that
the Comptroller had produced no evidence that the directors of the Auburn
Bank had been unjustly enriched.78 The Seventh Circuit held that, accord-
ingly, Congress' interest in protecting the directors from arbitrary action by
the Comptroller outweighed the Comptroller's interest in acting immediately
without the delay of legal action under the National Bank Act. 79
Although acknowledging the judicial precedent for the Comptroller's
authority to order a director to indemnify a bank pursuant to provisions
that Congress placed in FDIA through FIRA, the Larimore court distin-
guished the Eden decision and refused to follow the del Junco decision. 80
The Larimore court viewed the cease and desist order in Eden as an order
for restitution that directed the officers of the Eden Bank to return property
of the bank that the officers had appropriated unlawfully for personal
gain.," The Larimore court stated that the Eden decision was one of the
73. See id. at 1254 (discussing countervailing interests shown by Congress when Congress
attempted to expand authority of Banking Agencies while also protecting directors); see supra
note 1 (discussing legislative history of FIRA and FISA).
74. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1254; see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982) (cease and desist order
provision in the FDIA).
75. Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1254.
76. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1254; see 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982) (cease and desist order
provision in the FDIA).
77. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1253.
78. Id. at 1254 n.1O.
79. Id.
80. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1254-55. See del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1344 (holding directors
liable for loans made in violation of lending limits under National Bank Act); In re First
National Bank of Eden, South Dakota v. Dept. of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller,
568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding directors liable for bonuses improperly paid to
themselves); supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text (discussing Bank of Eden decision);
supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text (discussing del Junco decision).
81. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1254-55; see Bank of Eden, 568 F.2d at 611-12 (upholding
Comptroller's order for directors to return bonuses improperly paid by directors to themselves).
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rare cases in which Congress in enacting FIRA did intend to grant indem-
nification authority to a Banking Agency. 82 The Larimore court criticized
the Eden opinion for approving the Comptroller's authority without having
provided any reason, statutory authority, or case law to support or to limit
the decision. 83 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit refused to transform the
Comptroller's narrow authority to prevent unjust enrichment under FIRA
into an authority to impose personal liability upon directors in all cases of
knowing violations of banking law.
8 4
Although refusing to follow the del Junco decision, the Larimore court
mentioned the decision briefly. The Larimore court acknowledged the sim-
ilarity between the cease and desist order in Larimore and the cease and
desist order directing officers of the Los Angeles National Bank to indemnify
the Los Angeles National Bank for loans made in violation of the National
Bank Act.85 Without refuting or distinguishing del Junco, the Larimore
court pointed out that the del Junco court neither set forth nor analyzed
any argument that supported the Comptroller's authority to order directors
personally to indemnify a bank within a cease and desist order.8 6 Accord-
ingly, the Larimore court flatly rejected the del Junco decision.
87
82. Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1254-55; see Bank of Eden, 568 F.2d at 611-12 (upholding
Comptroller's order for directors to return bonuses improperly paid by directors to themselves).
83. Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1254-55; see Bank of Eden, 682 F.2d at 611-612 (Eighth
Circuit upheld Comptroller's cease and desist order with very little comment).
84. Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1255.
85. Id.; see del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1344 (Ninth Circuit upheld Comptroller's order holding
directors of bank personally liable for violating lending limits under National Bank Act, 12
U.S.C. § 84 0981)).
86. Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1346; see del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1344 (Eighth Circuit upheld
Comptroller's cease and desist order).
87. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1254-55; del Junco, 682 F.2d at 1344. Although falling to
follow the Eden Bank or the del Junco decision, the Seventh Circuit in Larimore II supported
its rejection of the Comptroller's cease and desist order by analyzing Citizens State Bank of
Marshfield, Mo. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1254;
see Citizens State Bank of Marshfield, Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 751 F.2d
209, 214 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that Comptroller acted improperly in ordering bank to
reimburse customers for overcharges resulting from violations of TILA). In Marshfield the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the FDIA authorized
the FDIC to order a bank to reimburse customers for overcharges resulting from improper
loan disclosures that violated the Truth In Lending Act (TILA). Marshfield, 751 F.2d at 215;
see also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1982).
In Marshfield the FDIC conducted two routine examinations of the Citizens State Bank
(Citizens Bank), the first in 1977 and the second in 1980. Marshfield, 751 F.2d at 211. In the
second examination the FDIC uncovered violations of TILA on nine loans made before the
first examination by the FDIC. Id. The FDIC initiated a cease and desist order proceeding.
Id. At the administrative hearing, the ALJ adopted the FDIC's findings, and the FDIC entered
a cease and desist order pursuant to the FDIA that directed Citizens Bank to discontinue the
improper loan disclosure procedure. Id. The order also required Citizens Bank to search bank
records back to January 1977 and to reimburse all customers for overcharges arising from the
improper loan disclosures. Id. Citizens Bank appealed the cease and desist order to the Eighth
Circuit. Id.
On appeal Citizens Bank first contended that substantial evidence did not support the
[Vol. 44:1357
CEASE AND DESIST ORDER A UTHORITY
In declining to follow either the Bank of Eden court's or the del Junco
court's decision to uphold a Banking Agency's indemnification power, the
Larimore court closely scrutinized the Comptroller's power under FIRA to
levy a civil money penalty against a director of a bank.8 The Larimore
court found that Congress had intended to strengthen the Comptroller's
ability to enforce the National Bank Act by providing a specific adminis-
trative remedy, the civil money penalty. s9 The Larimore court reasoned that
Congress did not, however, intend any change or expansion in the Comp-
troller's authority to establish the liability of an individual director by suing
order and that the order was arbitrary and capricious because of subsequent changes made by
Congress to TILA. Id. Citizens Bank argued that at the administrative hearing the FDIC
improperly had included nine loans that violated TILA when the FDIC made the first
examination of Citizens Bank in 1977. Id. at 214. Citizens Bank argued that, furthermore, the
FDIC had included the loans even though the ALJ had recommended that the FDIC should
exclude the loans from the cease and desist order. Id. Citizens Bank contended that if the
FDIC had not considered the nine loans, the FDIC could show no evidence to support a cease
and desist order. Id. The Marshfield court initially found that the FDIC had not abused its
enforcement authority by pursuing stale violations because all nine loans had occurred within
several months of the earlier FDIC examination. Id. The Marshfield court found that the
FDIC had acted properly in including the nine loans. Id. Having decided that the FDIC
properly had considered the nine loans, the Eighth Circuit in Marshfield addressed the question
of substantial evidence. Id. The FDIC had rejected the recommendation of the ALJ to
disregard the nine loan violation that the FDIC had not uncovered in the earlier investigation
in issuing the cease and desist order. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Marshfield held that substantial
evidence supported the cease and desist order because the FDIC had shown an awareness of
the AL's findings and had given reasons for including the nine loans. Id.
Having failed to convince the court that substantial evidence did not support the cease
and desist order, Citizens Bank argued that the FDIC had no authority to require the bank
to reimburse customers for overcharges from the improper loan disclosures. Id. The Marshfield
court did agree with Citizens Bank, finding that the order directing Citizens Bank to reimburse
customers was arbitrary, capricious, and outside the cease and desist authority of the FDIC
under the FDIA. Id. at 214-216; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1983). The Marshfield court
reasoned that because the disputed loans no longer violated TILA when the FDIC issued the
cease and desist order, the order would not protect the public or prevent future violations of
TILA. Id. at 215. The Marshfield court stated that, further, the context of the statute that the
FDIC sought to enforce determined the extent of affirmative remedies under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act. Id. at 217. The court then examined the legislative history of TILA
and found that TILA did not specifically authorize the FDIC to order reimbursement from
banks that violated TILA. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Marshfield concluded that the agency
order served no function beyond the function of a civil remedy, the private right of action
that Congress granted for violations of TILA. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982) (TILA provision
granting private right of action). Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit approved the FDIC finding
that Citizens Bank had violated TILA, but rejected the FDIC order to reimburse customers
for overcharges. Marshfield, 751 F.2d at 219.
88. See Larimore I1, 789 F.2d at 1254 (discussing variety of regulatory devices available
to Comptroller for preventing unsafe banking practices); 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (1982) (provision
in National Bank Act that allows Comptroller to assess civil money penalty for violation of
banking law). Section 93(b) of the National Bank Act expressly authorizes the Comptroller to
levy a civil money penalty of as much as 1000 dollars per day against an individual director
for violating the National Bank Act. 12 U.S.C. §93(b) (1982).
89. Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1254.
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pursuant to the National Bank Act. 9o The Larimore court noted that in
granting the new authority to assess a civil money penalty, Congress had
provided no new administrative procedures for assessing personal liability. 9'
With no evidence of congressional intent to create new administrative
procedures, the Larimore court refused to impute to Congress the intent to
establish a new indemnification power. 92
The Comptroller, however, argued that the amendment to the National
Bank Act under FIRA afforded the Comptroller the option to sue a director
in federal court or to begin an administrative proceeding against a director.9
The Larimore court rejected the Comptroller's interpretation of the amend-
ment because Congress had mentioned no option to order indemnification
in the amendmentY4 The Larimore court concluded that the Comptroller's
interpretation of the expanded cease and desist authority would render
obsolete the Comptroller's authority to sue a director under the National
Bank Act, a result that Congress did not intend. 9
In addition to arguing that the National Bank Act granted to the
Comptroller an option to assess liability through administrative process, the
Comptroller contended that the Larimore court should interpret the general
enabling language in the FDIA expansively. 96 The Larimore court acknowl-
edged that cases construing a similar act, the National Labor Relations Act,
might support the Comptroller's expanded authority. 97 The Larimore court
found, however, that differences in the wording of the National Labor
Relations Act, as well as in the legislative history of the Act, reinforced the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to delegate to the Comptroller the
authority to impose personal liability. 9 The Larimore court concluded that
the Comptroller's reference to the National Labor Relations Act, therefore,
was an inapposite analogy that weakened the Comptroller's interpretation
90. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (1982).





96. Id. at 1256; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1982) (provision in FDIA that allows Banking
Agency to take necessary affirmative action to enforce cease and desist orders); see supra note
6 (setting forth text of FDIA enabling provision).
97. Larimore II at 1256; 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
98. Larimore 11 at 1256. Section 160(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
empowers the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to issue a cease and desist order
requiring a person to refrain from conducting an unfair business practice, and "to take such
affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). The United States Supreme
Court has approved a wide variety of NLRB action under § 160(c) of the NLRA, including a
requirement that a company offer employment to certain persons. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 181-82 (1941) (mining company prohibited from refusing to hire labor
union members); see also Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 545 (1943)
(approving NLRB order requiring company to dissolve union and reimburse company employees
for dues paid).
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of the cease and desist authority granted by Congress in FIRA. 99
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Larimore culminates a growing judicial
trend to restrict the cease and desist authority of Banking Agencies.' °
Notwithstanding the deference to the Comptroller shown by the Bank of
Eden and del Junco courts, various federal appellate courts have restricted
the scope of Banking Agencies' cease and desist authority substantially. 0
The Banking Agencies, however, protest that restricting potential regulatory
action will prevent the agencies from ensuring a safe financial investment
community.1 2 The vast majority of regulatory action taken by Banking
Agencies occurs on an informal level. 03 Accordingly, the effectiveness of
an agency in regulating banking practice is directly proportionate to the
Banking Agency's ability to threaten offending financial institutions and
their directors effectively. 10 Because Congress intended in FIRA to allow
the Banking Agencies enough authority to control harmful banking practices,
a Banking Agency should have the strong regulatory powers necessary to
negotiate with a bank and its directors. 05
While intending FIRA to make Banking Agencies more effective, Con-
gress sought to minimize the potential for arbitrary governmental action by
a non-elected administrative official. ' 6 Congress did not want to place
99. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1256.
100. Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1256 (holding that Comptroller could not order director
personally to indemnify bank for amount of loans made in violation of National Bank Act);
see, e.g., Citizens State Bank of Marshfield, Mo. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 751 F.2d 209,
214 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that Comptroller acted improperly in ordering bank to reimburse
customers for overcharges resulting from violations of TILA); First National Bank of Ballaire
v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that Comptroller
improperly used cease and desist authority to order bank to adjust amount of working capital);
Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 665 F.2d 279, 289 (10th Cir.
1981) (holding that FHLLB could not use cease and desist authority to order savings & loan
association to cease offering legal consumer accounts); Gulf Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n
of Jefferson Parish v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 651 F.2d 259, 261 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1121 (1981) (holding that NHLBB could not use cease and desist authority to
order savings and loan association to direct savings and loan to change method of calculating
interest on loans).
101. See supra note 100 (listing some judicial attempts to restrict regulatory action by
agencies).
102. See GAO, Federal Supervision of State and National Banks: A Study by the
Comptroller General of the United States, 8-2 - 8-3 (1977) (reviewing uses of regulatory devices
by Banking Agencies and discussing need for expanded authority).
103. See id. at 8-1 (giving overview of GAO analysis of bank agency enforcement actions);
Vartanian & Schley, supra note 8, at 1027 (Banking Agencies accomplish vast majority of
regulation by use of supervisory agreements and informal intervention).
104. See Vartanian & Schley, supra note 8, at 1031 (comparing Banking Agency authority
to arsenal that Congress enforced to prevent bank failures).
105. See FIRA House Report, supra note 1, at 9289 (stating that Congress expected
Banking Agencies to utilize vigorously new regulatory authority under FIRA to curtail harmful
banking practices).
106. Id. at 9290.
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absolute judicial authority in the hands of a single government official.' 7
Thus, Congress never authorized the Comptroller to remove a director
without judicial proceedings.'10 Furthermore, in creating director liability
for violating banking law, Congress specifically required the Comptroller to
establish before a federal district court that a director violated the banking
law knowingly.' 9 As the Larimore court pointed out, the complaint of
Banking Agencies that existing regulatory devices are too cumbersome and
drastic for effective use loses credibility given the drastic alternative that
the agencies seek to use: imposing a binding judgment of personal liability
107. See S. REP. No. 1482, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3532, 3539-40. Congress did not delegate absolute judicial authority to Banking
Agencies for two reasons. First, Congress feared that delegation of absolute authority would
allow uncontrolled and arbitrary exercise of power by an appointed administrative body. See
FIRA House Report, supra note I, at 9290. Second, and more importantly, Congress recognized
that absolute delegation potentially is unconstitutional. Id. Article III of the United States
Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme Court of the United
States and in such courts as Congress may choose to create. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article
III judges hold office during good behavior, and Congress cannot lower compensation paid
to a judge during the term of office. Id. The good behavior clause guarantees an Article III
judge a life tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment. See United States ex rel. Toth
v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955). The compensation clause further assures the Article III judge
a fixed compensation for services. Id. The famous rationale for the life term and the fixed
compensation is that "next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. In the general course of
human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." Tim
FEDERALIST No. 79 (A. Hamilton) at 491 (H. Lodge Ed. 1888). By assuring the unprejudiced
nature of the Article III judge, the Constitution attempts to preserve the rights of defendants.
See id.
Members of Banking Agencies all serve fixed terms, and the Comptroller is subject to
removal by the executive. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (Comptroller appointed to five year
term by President, subject to removal "upon reasons to be communicated by [President] to
Senate"); 12 U.S.C. § 1812 (1982) (members of FDIC appointed by President to six year terms)l
12 U.S.C. § 241 (members of Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System appointed by
President to fourteen year terms). Arguably, Congress cannot delegate to an agency the
authority to adjudicate personal liability, because that authority belongs solely to an Article
III judge. Congress may, however delegate to an agency the duty to adjudicate issues that a
federal statute creates. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (holding that OSHA may issue civil money penalties for violations
of OSHA work place safety regulations without violating jury requirement of seventh amend-
ment). Congress has not specifically delegated to Banking Agencies the authority to adjudicate
a knowing violation of the National Bank Act. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1982). As a result, the
Comptroller or any other Banking Agency usurps the function of an Article III judge, and
any adjudication of personal liability is unconstitutional. See Citizens State Bank of Marshfield
Mi. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 751 F.2d 209, 219 (8th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging issue of
improper delegation of judicial function to administrative official); supra note 87 (discussing
MarshfIeld decision).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(2)(4) (1966). Congress refused to empower the Comptroller to
remove a bank director without judicial proceedings because Congress preferred to delegate
the'power to the collective judgment of a group of officials rather than to a single official.
See FISA Senate Report, supra note 1, at 3539-40.
109. See supra note 63 (discussing procedure for Comptroller to sue an individual director
for knowing violation of banking law).
[Vol. 44:1357
CEASE AND DESIST ORDER AUTHORITY
in excess of a million dollars after only an administrative hearing. 110 Ac-
cordingly the drastic effect an indemnification order has upon a director is
inconsistent with Congress' intent to restrict arbitrary government action
against an individual.",
Even when a Banking Agency lacks the power to order a director
personally to indemnify a bank, the regulatory authority that Congress
conferred upon Banking Agencies through the cease and desist order pro-
visions is considerable. The cease and desist order provisions permit Banking
Agencies to stop fraudulent practices quickly." 2 The provisions do not,
however, allow a Banking Agency to recover affirmatively for harm caused
by either a director's or a bank's violation of banking law." 3 Congress did
not intend the Banking Agencies to use the authority conferred through
FIRA as a punitive device." 4 Although restricting Banking Agency's cease
and desist authority under FIRA, the Larimore decision does not overly
confine the Banking Agencies' ability to regulate banks because the Banking
Agencies have other regulatory powers." 5 Under a stringent interpretation
of its regulatory powers a Banking Agency may bring an action to revoke
a bank's charter and end the bank's ability to do business. 16 In addition,
the Banking Agency may issue a cease and desist order against a bank and
collect 1000 dollars for every day the bank does not comply with the order." 7
The Banking Agency also may issue a cease and desist order directly against
a director of a bank and collect a penalty of 1000 dollars for every day the
director does not follow the order."8 Moreover, the Banking Agency may
choose to establish the personal liability of the director or to force removal
of the director by suing in a federal district court." 9 In sum, the Banking
110. See Larimore II, 789 F.2d at 1250 n.5 (discussing drastic effect of Comptroller's
ordering director personally to indemnify bank).
111. See FIRA House Report, supra note 1, at 9290 (discussing Congress' desire to prevent
arbitrary action by Banking Agencies).
112. See FSLIC v. Fielding, 3909 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D. Nev. 1969) (purpose of cease
and desist order provisions was to stop fraud practices quickly, not to recover affirmatively
for them), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1970).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Larimore 1I, 789 F.2d at 1256 (holding that Comptroller cannot impose personal
liability upon bank director without judicial proceedings under National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 93(b) (1982)).
116. See 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1982) (Comptroller may require disenfranchisement of any bank
that knowingly violates National Bank Act).
117. See supra note 19 (discussing procedure for challenging cease and desist authority
under National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1); note 5 (discussing procedure for levying civil
money penalty under National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (1982)).
118. See supra note 19 (discussing procedure for challenging cease and desist authority
under National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1)); note 5 (discussing procedure for levying civil
money penalty under National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (1982)).
119. See supra note I (discussing procedure for director removal under FISA); supra note
63 (discussing procedure for establishing director liability under National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 93(a)).
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Agency's ability to assert leverage against directors or banks is substantial.
In contrast, the ability of the director of a bank to protect himself from
an improper order of indemnification is minimal. If a Banking Agency did
have the power to order a director to indemnify a bank, the Banking Agency
would need only to support its findings with substantial evidence.'12 The
substantial evidence test requires a court to defer to any reasonable inter-
pretation of the agency's record.' 2' The Banking Agency then would need
to show that the decision to act was not arbitrary or capricious.'2 The
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, however, is less difficult for a
Banking Agency to meet than the substantial evidence standard.'2 Thus, to
prevent liability, a director would have to prove to a reviewing court that
the agency could not support its action by any reasonable interpretation of
a record that the agency itself had compiled.n 4 Because a court's power to
review a Banking Agency's action is narrow, the Banking Agency's power
to hold a director liable in practice would be limited only by the restraint
exercised by the Banking Agency itself in determining whether to issue an
indemnification order.12s In contrast, the Larimore decision restricts unfet-
tered Banking Agency action against an individual while preserving a Bank-
ing Agency's ability to regulate effectively through the use of cease and
desist orders, civil money penalties, and, in certain rare cases, orders for
directors to return bank property. 26
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Larimore adopts a middle position that
satisfactorily balances Congress' desire to protect individual directors and
Congress' intent to regulate financial institutions effectively.' 27 The extent
of protection a director will receive from a Banking Agency's cease and
desist order authority, however, is unclear. While the Larimore court's
rejection of the Comptroller's indemnification order was unequivocal, the
Comptroller did not appeal the Seventh Circuit's decision. In addition, other
United States courts of appeals have approved cease and desist orders that
120. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing substantial evidence standard
under APA).
121. See R. PrERcE, ADMIsThATIV' LAW AwD PRoc.ss 357-60 (1985) (discussing substan-
tial evidence standard and concluding that standard is not difficult for agency to meet).
122. See supra note 19 (discussing arbitrary and capricious standard under APA).
123. See PmRCE, supra note 121, at 360-63 (arguing that substantial evidence standard
and arbitrary and capricious standards are indistinguishable in practice, despite dicta from
United States Supreme Court that states that arbitrary and capricious standard is less de-
manding).
124. See, supra, notes 120-123 & accompanying test (discussing restriction of arbitrary
and capricious and substantial evidence standards of review upon court's ability to limit
Banking Agencies actions).
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing Larimore 11 court's narrow
interpretation of Bank of Eden decision).
127. See Larimore 11, 789 F.2d at 1244 (holding that Comptroller could not order directors
of Auburn Bank personally to indemnify Auburn Bank); supra notes 73-91 and accompanying
text (discussing Larimore 11 court's analysis of legislative and judicial history of cease and
desist order provisions in the FDIA).
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forced directors personally to indemnify a bank. 28 Accordingly, the Comp-
troller, along with other Banking Agencies, may continue to order directors
personally to indemnify banks. The reasoning of the Larimore court is
persuasive and most likely will prevail in subsequent litigation. 129 The burden
of resisting the cease and desist orders, however, will rest with individual
directors, and the Larimore decision may even strengthen a Banking Agen-
cy's ability to regulate effectively by enabling the Banking Agency to threaten
costly litigation unless the directors of a bank follow its commands closely. 30
Nonetheless, because of the amounts of money involved, future litigation
is almost inevitable.' 3' The Larimore decision has set the tone for future
lawsuits by analyzing completely Banking Agency authority to use cease
and desist orders and by setting definite limits on that authority.
32
ALAN F. GARRisON
128. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (discussing decision of Eighth Circuit
in Bank of Eden); notes 21-47 and accompanying text (discussing decision of Ninth Circuit in
del Junco).
129. See supra notes 49-99 and accompanying text (discussing Larimore II decision).
130. See supra notes 101-27 and accompanying text (discussing strength of various regu-
latory devices used by Banking Agencies, and concluding that informal negotiation is Banking
Agency's most practical weapon).
131. See supra note 28 (potential liability under cease and desist order in del Junco was
$350,000); note 57 (potential liability for majority of directors in Larimore II was over
$1,000,000).
132. See supra notes 48-100 and accompanying text (discussing extensive rationale for
Larimore II court's refusal to allow Comptroller to order directors of Auburn Bank personally
to indemnify bank).
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